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Since its introduction in 1999, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) has become the 
de-facto standard for wireless networking, providing mobility and connectivity at 
relatively  low cost.  
However, the key concern with the 802.11 WLANs has been security. 
Wireless signals can travel long distances and are not bounded by physical 
boundaries such as walls and perimeters. Since the Radio Frequency (RF) 
spectrum is a shared medium, wireless signals can also be picked up by 
unintended recipients such as potential attackers (with the right equipment). As 
noted by [Borisov 2002], when wireless signals are sent across radio waves,  
“interception and masquerading becomes trivial to anyone with a radio”.  This 
can compromise the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information in a 
network.   
This thesis studies the problem of designing a secure 802.11-based 
wireless network architecture for an enterprise. The Department of Defense 
(DoD) was the main sponsor for this study, and the design of the architecture is 
based on requirements provided by the DoD and related intelligence agencies.  
 
B. SCOPE 
The thesis will answer the following questions, leading to the development 
of a wireless enterprise architecture for the DoD network:  
1. What are the requirements for the DoD enterprise system?  
2. How do current wireless technologies, in particular the IEEE 802.11 
standard, perform with respect to the specified requirements? Are 
there areas of non-compliance that have to be addressed? 
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3. What are other supporting technologies that can be applied to 
better secure the network? 
The specific security requirements for the DoD enterprise system were 
studied and analyzed. Extensive research was conducted on the IEEE 802.11 
standard, focusing on the security protocols that are built-in with the 802.11 
security standard, namely the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wireless 
Protected Access (WPA) and the IEEE 802.11i protocols.  These security 
protocols were analyzed in detail, and examined for compliance to the 
requirements for the enterprise network. 
A key consideration in the design of the wireless enterprise architecture is 
to be able to provide defense-in-depth for the network. [NIST 2002] recommends 
that “the built-in security features of 802.11 (data link level encryption and 
authentication protocols) be used as part of an overall defense-in-depth 
strategy”. This thesis will look further into other security mechanisms and best 
practices that can be built into a multi-layered defense mechanism for the 
wireless network.  
  
C. REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW 
The primary aim of this thesis is to design an enterprise architecture for 
specific security requirements for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.  
Since the DoD’s goal was to use this enterprise architecture in Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) or by organizations processing 
intelligence information, the enterprise architecture must comply with the Director 
of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID). The specific requirements that are used 
in this thesis are found in the following documents: 
• DCID 6/3 Manual, “Protecting Sensitive Compartmented 
Information within Information Systems”  
• DCID 6/9 Manual, “Physical Security Standards for Compartmented 
Information Facilities” 
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For this study, we assume that Level of Concern for Confidentiality to be 
HIGH  with  Protection  Level 1 required.  The  Levels of Concern for Integrity 
and Availability are assumed to be MEDIUM. The highest level of data that will 
be processed within the enterprise network is restricted to “UNCLASSIFIED For 
Official Use Only”.   
 
D. DESIGN STRATEGY 
The strategy for the design of the enterprise architecture takes into 
consideration the following factors. In the current state of the art in wireless 
technology, wireless networks are less secure compared to wired networks and 
the data throughput supported in wireless networks is also often significantly 
lower. Based on the security and performance considerations, it is not practical to 
design a pure wireless network system for the enterprise. Furthermore, most 
enterprises already deploy extensive wired networks, and considerable effort has 
been spent to secure these networks. This strategy proposes a hybrid solution in 
which the wireless network is designed to extend the services of an existing 
wired network.  The key points of the strategy is illustrated in Figure 1 and 








Segregate and secure the Wired Network
Protect Wireless Link Layer 
Communications
 
Figure 1. Design Strategy 
 
1. Segregate and secure the wired network. This involves building a 
strong defensive perimeter around the boundary of the wired network, and 
hosting the mission critical computers and servers within the wired 
network.  Standard techniques such as using firewalls and intrusion 
detection tools can be applied. Since the techniques to secure wired 
networks are well known, they will not be further discussed in this report.   
2. Deploy the wireless infrastructure outside the perimeter of the wired 
network. This will prevent inherent weaknesses in WLAN security from 
creating vulnerabilities in the defensive perimeter of the wired network. 
3. Protect the RF links used to carry information from between access 
points and the mobile device. The link has to be secured to protect 
information and data that is transmitted over the airwaves. In this study, 
we will focus on the link layer WEP, WPA and the 802.11i protocols. 
4. Provide end to end security between hosts in the wired and 
wireless networks. Note that link layer only protects data packets in transit 
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over the RF medium. By providing end-to-end security, data in transit will 
be protected over the wired and wireless networks.  
 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides an overview of the DCID specifications and an 
analysis of the specific requirements that are applicable to the wireless network 
architecture 
Chapter III will focus on the protection of the wireless links between the 
mobile nodes and the wireless infrastructure. This chapter provides a detailed 
description of the key protocols used in 802.11 to provide link protection, namely 
the WEP, WPA and the IEEE 802.11i protocols.   
Chapter IV studies the security mechanisms that can be built over the 
IEEE 802.11 standard to provide end-to-end protection, and provide a strong 
layered-defense architecture for the network.  This chapter also provides a 
description of an access control prototype that can be used to control the flow of 
sensitive information in the enterprise network.  
Finally, Chapter V concludes the findings of this thesis, and provides 
































This chapter provides an overview of the requirements that were specified 
for the enterprise architecture. The requirements were based extensively on the 
Director Of Central Intelligence Agency Directives (DCID) 6/3 and 6/9 
documents.  This chapter focuses on the relevant requirements that are 
applicable to the wireless network, and is not intended to provide a 
comprehensive study of the abovementioned DCID documents. For additional 
details, refer to [DCID 6/3 1999] and [DCID 6/9 2002]. 
 
A. DCID 6/9 “PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR 
 COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES” 
The DCID 6/9 manual establishes the physical security standards to 
govern the construction and protection of facilities for storing, processing and 
discussing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) which requires 
extraordinary safeguards.   The focus of DCID 6/9 is to provide physical 
protection requirements for SCIFs, with the intention to prevent as well as detect 
visual, acoustical, technical, and physical access by unauthorized persons.  
Detailed specifications on the physical controls and the construction criteria 
required for a SCIF are provided.  
 For the most part, the DCID 6/9 manual is concerned with the 
construction and physical security of facilities that are used to house SCI. The 
sections that are related to the use of wireless technologies are Annex D Part I 
which provides guidelines on the use of electronic equipment in SCIFs, and 
Annex G which covers the approval process required for the deployment of 





B. DCID 6/3 “PROTECTING SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED 
 INFORMATION WITHIN INFORMATION SYSTEMS” 
The DCID 6/3 manual provides policy guidance and requirements for the 
protection of SCI stored or processed on an Information System (IS). An IS is 
defined as any telecommunications and/or computer related equipment or 
interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the 
acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, 
switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of voice and/or data.  DCID 6/3 
applies to all United States Government departments and agencies, their 
contractors and allied governments processing intelligence information.  
The DCID 6/3 manual defines the concepts of Level of Concern and 
Protection Level, and provides guidance on how to use these concepts to 
determine the appropriate technical security requirements for confidentiality, 
integrity and availability that each IS must meet.  
 
1. Level-of-Concern 
The DCID 6/3 manual defines Level-of-Concern as a rating assigned to an 
IS. A separate Level-of-Concern is assigned for confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, and this can be BASIC, MEDIUM, or HIGH.  
The Level-of-Concern assigned to an IS for confidentiality is based on the 
sensitivity of the information it maintains, processes, and transmits. By definition, 
any system that processes intelligence information requires a HIGH Level-of-
Concern rating. MEDIUM and BASIC levels of concern are not applicable to 
confidentiality, since any system that is accredited by the DCID 6/3 by definition 
processes intelligence information. Since the architecture discussed in this paper 
is accredited under the DCID 6/3 manual, it is assigned a HIGH confidentiality 
Level-of-Concern.  
 The Level-of-Concern assigned to an IS for integrity is based on the 
degree of resistance to unauthorized modifications. The Level-of-Concern 
assigned to an IS for availability is based on the needed availability of the 
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information maintained, processed and transmitted by the system for mission 
accomplishment, and how much tolerance for delay is allowed.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the indicators for Confidentiality, Integrity 
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request, with no 
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life might result 
from loss of 
availability, or loss 
of availability will 
have an adverse 
effect on national 
level interests, or 
loss of availability 
will have an 
adverse effect on 
confidentiality. 
 
Table 1.   Summary of Key Indicators for Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability for Various Levels-of-Concern [DCID 6/3 1999] 
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2. Protection Level 
The DCID 6/3 manual defines Protection Level as an “indication of the 
implicit level of trust that is placed in a system’s technical capabilities”. The 
concept of Protection Level is applicable only to confidentiality. A Protection 
Level is determined based on the classification and sensitivity of information 
processed on the system, relative to the clearance(s), formal access approval(s) 
and need-to-know of all direct and indirect users that receive information from the 
IS without manual intervention and reliable human review.   
The DCID 6/3 manual specifies 5 different Protection Levels, ranging from 
PL1 to PL5, and the criteria for selecting the suitable Protection Levels for an IS 
is shown in Table 2. 
Protection Level Criteria  
PL 1 An IS operates at Protection Level 1 when all users have all 
required approvals for access to all information on the IS. 
This means that all users have all required clearances, 
formal access approvals, and the need to know for all 
information on the IS. 
PL 2 An IS operates at Protection Level 2 when all users have all 
required formal approvals for access to all information on 
the IS, but at least one user lacks administrative approval 
for some of the information on the IS, This means that all 
users have all required clearances and all required formal 
access approvals, but at least one user lacks the need to 
know for some of the information on the IS. 
PL 3 An IS operates at Protection Level 3 when at least one user 
lacks at least one required formal approval for access to all 
information on the IS. This means that all users have all 
required clearances, but at least one user lacks formal 
access approval for some of the information on the IS. 
PL 4 An IS operates at Protection Level 4 when at least one user 
lacks sufficient clearance for access to some of the 
information on the IS, but all users have at least a SECRET 
clearance. 
PL 5 An IS operates at Protection Level 5 when at least one user 
lacks any clearance for access to some of the information 
on the IS. 




C. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS 
The broad requirements for specified by the DoD for the areas of 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are as follows: 
Confidentiality:  Level-of-Concern HIGH, Protection Level 1 (PL1) 
Integrity:  Level-of-Concern MEDIUM 
Availability:  Level-of-Concern MEDIUM 
Based on the Level-of-Concern and Protection Level required, the policies 
that are applicable to the design of the wireless enterprise architecture are 
extracted. These are tabulated and shown in Table 3. 
POLICY REFERENCE 
CONFIDENTIALITY (Level of Concern: HIGH, PL1) 
Data Storage 
Information encrypted using NSA-approved encryption 
mechanisms appropriate for the classification of stored 
data 
DCID 6/3 4.B.1.a(7)(d) 
Data Transmission 
Information distributed using NSA-approved encryption 
mechanisms appropriate for the classification of the 
information 
DCID 6/3 4.B.1.a(8)(a)(3) 
Identification and Authentication 
An identification and authentication (I&A) management 
mechanism that ensures a unique identifier for each 
user and that associates that identifier with auditable 
actions taken by the user 
DCID 6/3 4.B.1.b(3) 
Identification and Authentication 
Access to the IS by privileged users who either reside 
outside of the IS’s perimeter or whose communications 
traverse data links(extranets, INTERNET, phone links) 
that are outside of the IS’s perimeter shall require the 
use of  strong authentication (i.e., an I&A technique that 
is resistant to replay attacks) 
DCID 6/3 4.B.1.b(4) 
INTEGRITY (Level of Concern: MEDIUM) 
Protect against unauthorized modification/tampering of 
data in transit over the wireless medium 
 
Table 3.   Specific Requirements for the Wireless Enterprise 
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D. REQUIREMENTS FOR AVAILABILITY 
The policies and requirements shown in Table 3 are focused on the areas 
of confidentiality and integrity. For the area of Availability with MEDIUM level of 
concern, the DCID 6/3 manual specifies that adequate processes and 
procedures to allow for the restoration of a system in the event of a failure. DCID 
6/3 also requires the implementation of “communications capability that provides 
adequate communications to accomplish the mission when the primary 
operations communications capabilities are unavailable” [DCID 6/3 1999, Section 
6.B.2.a(4)].  
The requirements for availability are addressed by providing sufficient 
redundancy and back-ups in the wired and wireless networks. In fact, the 
redundancy design should be focused on the wired domain, since this is where 
the mission critical servers and computers will be located. On the wireless 
domain, provide sufficient spare network capacity which can be activated in the 
event of a network failure. Mission critical functionalities provided in the wireless 
network should also be replicated in the wired network. These measures will 





III. IEEE 802.11: LINK SECURITY MECHANISMS 
This chapter examines the different link layer security protocols that are 
provided in the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard. (A simple overview of the 802.11 
standard is provided in Appendix A).  The purpose of these protocols is to protect 
communications traveling over airwaves between mobile nodes and access 
points, and prevent unauthorized access to information on the network.  
In this chapter, we will first study the WEP protocol and look into its well-
publicized weaknesses. This will be followed by an analysis of the protocols that 
were developed to replace WEP, specifically the IEEE 802.1x Port-Based 
authentication, WPA and the IEEE 802.11i protocols. An evaluation and 
comparison of these protocols will be made with respect to the requirements of 
the enterprise network. 
 
A. WIRED EQUIVALENT PRIVACY (WEP) 
The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies a security standard known as WEP to 
provide security for the wireless network. A detailed discussion on the WEP is 
provided to give a better understanding of its limitations, and how these 
limitations will eventually be remedied by the WPA and IEEE 802.11i protocols.  
WEP was designed to provide security on the wireless network at a level 
equivalent to wired networks. The 3 main security goals for WEP are: [Borisov 
2002]: 
• Confidentiality: Prevent eavesdropping by using an encryption 
scheme based on the RC4 stream cipher.  
• Access Control: Protect access to a wireless network 
infrastructure by requiring users to demonstrate knowledge of a 
shared secret key k (more commonly known as the WEP key). This 
key is shared among all legitimate users of the WLAN network. 
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• Data Integrity: To prevent tampering of the transmitted messages, 
through a CRC-32 checksum.  
Message, M CRC





Figure 2. WEP Encryption Process 
 
A description of the encryption process used in WEP is shown in Figure 2. 
We assume that the user has the correct secret key k to access the network. The 
process to encrypt a user generated message M is as follows: 
Step 1: A 32 bit Cyclic Redundancy Checksum (CRC) is computed for the 
message M. The CRC is appended with message M to form the plaintext 
message P. 
Step 2:   A RC4 keystream is generated using the secret key k and an 
Initialization Vector (IV) as inputs. The IV is used to ensure that subsequent data 
packets are encrypted with different keystreams, even though the same secret 
key is used.  
Step 3: The RC4 keystream is EXCLUSIVE-ORed (XOR) with the 
plaintext message P, to generate the ciphertext C. 
Step 4: The IV is concatenated with the ciphertext, and the entire frame is 
transmitted. The IV is not encrypted and is transmitted in the clear.  
Step 5: When the message frame arrives at the recipient (another host on 
the wireless network also possessing the secret key k), the IV is extracted from 
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the frame. The IV is used together with the shared secret key k to generate the 
original RC4 keystream. The original plaintext P is then recovered by performing 
an XOR of the ciphertext and keystream.  
Step 6: The recipient host performs an integrity check by computing the 
checksum for the received message, and comparing it with the received CRC 
checksum. The message passes the integrity check if the 2 checksums are 
identical. If the checksums are different, the message is considered to be 
compromised and will be discarded.  
Table 4 provides a summary of the various parameters used in the WEP 
mechanism 
PARAMETER PROPERTIES 
Secret key, k (aka WEP key) 40 bits (used in early versions of WEP) 
104 bits (current standard) 
Initialization Vector, IV 24 bits  
Integrity Checksum 32 bit CRC 
Encryption Algorithm RC4 Stream Cipher 
Table 4.   Specifications of Key Parameters used in WEP 
 
B. WEAKNESSES OF WEP 
The WEP mechanism came under intense scrutiny over the past few 
years due to its inherent security flaws. [Borisov 2002] demonstrated that WEP 
falls short of achieving its security goals for confidentiality, integrity and access 
control.  Based on their research, WEP was found to be insecure due to improper 
implementation of the RC4 algorithm and the use of the CRC 32 checksum for 






The CRC 32 checksum does not provide strong message integrity. It was 
shown that an attacker can modify the contents of a message packet as well as 
the corresponding CRC-32 checksum even without knowing the secret 
encryption key.   
 
2. Authentication 
The authentication mechanism used in WEP is a simple “challenge and 
response” scheme based on whether a user has knowledge of a shared secret. 
In the case of WEP, this shared secret is the WEP key that is shared among all 
users of the wireless network. The problem with using WEP authentication is that 
users cannot be individually identified and authenticated, since anyone with the 
WEP key will be granted access.  
Another issue with WEP is that it does not support mutual authentication. 
Hence a user cannot challenge and authenticate a network access point, and 
cannot be assured that it is connecting to a legitimate network.  
 
3. Confidentiality 
WEP does not protect confidentiality due to improper implementation of 
the RC4 algorithm in the WEP protocol. Poor key management, as well as the 
reuse of IV can allow attackers to break the WEP key if sufficient packets are 
sniffed and collected off the airwaves. Once the WEP key is broken, decrypting 
information carried on the wireless network becomes a trivial affair.  Tools have 
been developed that exploit the weaknesses in WEP and these can be freely 
downloaded via the Internet. Examples of such tools are AirSnort (available at 






C. IEEE 802.1X 
The IEEE 802.1x is a port based protocol that provides authentication and 
authorization for both wired and wireless networks. It was included in the 802.11 
standard to remedy the weaknesses in the authentication processes used in 
WEP.   IEEE 802.1x was ratified in Jun 2001, and is currently supported in many 
802.11 cards and access points. (The full specification is available at 
http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1x.html).  
 
1. Principle of Operation 
802.1x defines three entities in the authentication process [Edney and 
Arbaugh 2004]: 
• Supplicant - entity that wants to join a network i.e. a wireless client. 
• Authenticator - entity that controls access to the network.  In the 
case of WLANs, this refers to an access point. 
• Authentication server - entity that makes the authorization 
decisions. 
A general overview of the authentication process used in 802.1x is 









AUTHENTICATION SERVER SECURITY DATABASE
Enterprise Network
 
Figure 3. Overview of  802.1x Authentication Protocol                              
(from [Edney & Arbaugh 2004]) 
 
In Figure 3, an authenticator is created together with a logical port for each 
supplicant requesting access to the network. The authenticator controls access 
to network resources by using manipulating logical switches within the access 
point. By default, the logical switches are in the open position.  A wireless device 
has to submit credentials (such as user ID and a password) to the authenticator, 
which in turn relays these messages to the authentication server. The 
authentication server uses the credentials provided by the wireless device and 
determines if access is to be granted. If access is granted, the logical switch 
controlling the connection for that wireless device will be closed thereby enabling 





2. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
802.1x is intended to provide strong authentication, access control and 
key management control, which is not provided in WEP. 802.1x is based on EAP 
or more specifically EAP over Local Area Networks (EAPOL). EAP is general 
messaging protocol that provides communications and message exchanges 
between different parties in the authentication process. Note that EAP does not 
specify the type of authentication method used. However, different authentication 
methods have been implemented to work with EAP, including Kerberos, 
public/private keys, as well as biometrics.  For a full listing of EAP authentication 




















































Figure 4. General EAP Message Flow in Authentication Process             
(from [Edney & Arbaugh 2004]) 
The general authentication sequence using EAP is shown in Figure 4. A 
supplicant starts the authentication process by sending an EAP-Start message to 
the authenticator. On receiving the EAP-Start message, the authenticator 
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responds with an EAP Request Identity message to determine the identity of the 
supplicant. The supplicant follows up by sending its identify information using the 
EAP Response Identity message which is forwarded by the authenticator to the 
authentication server. The authentication server initiates a series of challenges to 
the supplicant, which provides responses to each challenge.  The authentication 
server checks the responses received from the supplicant, and returns a 
Success message to the authenticator if the responses are correct. On receiving 
the Success message from the authentication server, the authenticator grants 
access to the supplicant. 
Most current applications use the EAP-TLS method (one of the EAP 
methods) for authentication with an authentication server. EAP-TLS (EAP-
Tunneled Layer Security) uses a certificate-based mechanism to perform mutual 
authentication and key exchange, and is generally considered to be the strongest 
EAP method. Since EAP-TLS uses certificates, PKI must be supported in the 
enterprise network.  The authentication server is usually a RADIUS-based 
server. However, 802.1x does not specify RADIUS as the default authentication 
server, and other authentication servers can be used as long as the servers 
support EAP. 
 
D. WI-FI PROTECTED ACCESS 
The Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is a standards based, interoperable 
security specification developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance. The goal of WPA is to 
provide intermediary fixes to the vulnerabilities of WEP. Existing 802.11 network 
equipment can be upgraded to WPA through software or firmware upgrades.   
The key features of WPA are as follows: 
1. Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
TKIP is designed to address WEP’s weaknesses in data encryption. As 
discussed in the earlier sections, the current WEP implementation uses a static 
shared secret key together with a short (24 bit) initialization vector to generate 
the encryption keystream using the RC4 algorithm. 
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 TKIP continues to use the RC4 algorithm for data packet 
encryption. However, unlike WEP which uses a static shared secret key, TKIP 
uses a temporal key that is changed every 10000 packets. A longer 48 bit 
initialization vector is also adopted to prevent the reuse of initialization vectors 
over the life-time of a temporal key. These measures make it much more difficult 
for potential attackers to break the TKIP key using existing WEP-breaking 
techniques.  
 
2. Michael Message Integrity Check 
The Michael Message Integrity Check (MIC) is intended to provide 
protection data in transit against unauthorized modifications or tampering. The 
Michael algorithm uses a cryptographic digest of the original message as an 
integrity checksum. This protects the integrity of data packets on the wireless 
networks, since any attempt to modify packets will be detected.  
However, one important consideration in the design of WPA was to be 
able to operate on existing 802.11 devices with low CPU capacity. With the 
constraints of CPU power, it is not feasible to design the Michael MIC to provide 
the same level of security as other integrity checksums such as MD5. In view of 
this weakness, TKIP implements additional countermeasures to work with the 
Michael MIC. Specifically, when an access point detects two packets that have 
failed the Michael algorithm on a particular temporal key, it will drop the 
association, generate new keys and wait for a minute before creating a new 
association to the host.  
A concern with the TKIP countermeasures is that attackers can launch a 
denial of service attack by flooding access points with messages that have 
corrupted integrity checksums. This can result in repeated time-outs at the 
access points (for up to one minute each time), and thereby deny legitimate 
users from access to the network.  
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However, this risk of a possible denial of service attack should be weighed 
against the alternatives of WEP (which is fundamentally broken) or having no 
security mechanism at all. In the latter cases, an attacker can gain unrestricted 
access to the network and inflict damage while remaining undetected. In the case 
of WPA, network monitoring tools can be programmed to look out for frequent 
time-outs at access points which would indicate an active attack. This could 
provide responsive detection and execution of contingency plans to contain an 
attack.  
 
E. IEEE 802.11I 
The IEEE 802.11i standard was developed by the IEEE as a replacement 
for the flawed WEP protocol. The protocol was recently ratified by IEEE in May 
04, and first products supporting 802.11i are expected to be on the market in the 
early part of 2005.  
IEEE 802.11i is designed to be compatible with the WPA protocol. 802.11i 
supports TKIP encryption and the Michael Message Integrity Check used in 
WPA, as well as the 802.1x protocol for authentication. However, it should be 
noted that TKIP is built around the flawed implementation of the RC4 encryption 
algorithm in WEP, and is therefore considered to be an interim solution for 
encryption security.   
To counter the weaknesses in the RC4-based encryption, 802.11i 
introduces 2 additional encryption protocols based on the FIPS-approved 









1. Counter Mode with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) 
CCMP is the mandated encryption technique in the 802.11i standard. It 
employs the AES algorithm using the CCM mode of operation. CCM utilizes the 
Counter Mode (CTR) for data encryption and Cipher Block Chaining Message 
Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) to ensure message authenticity and integrity. 
CCMP uses the CTR mode in AES to encrypt data for transmission. The 
basic mechanism for AES CTR mode encryption is shown in Figure 5 below.  
IV IV+1 IV+2










Figure 5. AES Counter (CTR) Mode Encryption Process                          
(from [Kaufman 2002]) 
 
A 128 bit temporal key (K) together with a 48 bit IV is used to generate a 
one-time pad using the AES algorithm (E). The IV is incremented after 
generating each one-time pad. A logical OR operation is then performed with the 
message plaintext and the corresponding one-time pad. 
The advantage of using CTR mode is that it provides equivalent 
encryption security compared with other AES modes but is computationally less 
intensive. In CTR mode, the one-time pads can be pre-computed for a given 
temporal key, and the encryption is a simple logical OR operation. Since chaining 
is not employed in CTR mode, message packets can be decrypted independently 
 24
of previous message packets. However, the encryption process will be weakened 
if the same key and IV is used to encrypt different messages (this is the problem 
faced in WEP). To tackle this, the temporal key has to be refreshed periodically 
via the 802.1x protocol, and a longer 48 bit IV is used to prevent the IV collisions 







Figure 6. Message Integrity Check using CBC-MAC Computation 
 
To provide data integrity, a message integrity check (MIC) is generated for 
each message packet using CBC-MAC. This is illustrated in Figure 6. The MIC is 
computed over the payload and the header, and the resulting MIC is appended. 
Encryption is then applied over the payload and the MIC, while the header is sent 
in the clear. Since the header is included in the computation of the MIC, any 
unauthorized modification or corruption of the header will also be detected. This 








 WRAP was the original AES-based proposal for 802.11i encryption. This 
protocol is based on AES in the OCB (Output Feedback) mode. WRAP was 
replaced by CCMP due to intellectual property rights issues, but it was kept in the 
802.11i draft as some vendors had already implemented WRAP modules in their 
hardware.  
A summary of the key features of WEP, WPA and 802.11i is provided in 
Table 5. (For details on the AES algorithm, refer to [FIPS197 2001]) 
 
Key Features WEP WPA 802.11i 
Encryption 
Algorithm 
RC4 RC4 CCMP (using AES 
CCM) 
Key Size 40 or 104 bits 2 keys used 
128 bits key for 
encryption 






24 bit  48 bit 48 bit 
Integrity Check 32 bit CRC Michael MIC CBC-MAC 
Authentication and 
Key Management 











F. REQUIREMENTS MATRIX 
Table 6 provides a summary of WEP, WPA and 802.11i versus the 


















appropriate for the 




Not compliant Not compliant Compliant (a 
minimal 128 bit key 
length is required ) 
AES-encryption is 













appropriate for the 














ensures a unique 
identifier for each user 
and that associates 
that identifier with 
auditable actions 
taken by the user 
DCID 6/3 
4.B.1.b(3) 
Not compliant.  
Does not provide 
means to uniquely 
identify a user 
Compliant 
802.1x mechanism 











Access to the IS by 
privileged users who 
either reside outside 






links) that are outside 
of the IS’s perimeter 
shall require the use 
of  strong 
authentication (i.e., an 
I&A technique that is 























of data in transit over 
the wireless medium 
 Not compliant. 
WEP integrity 





denial of service 





Table 6.   Comparison of WEP, WPA and 802.11i Security Functions 
Versus DCID requirements 
 
G. COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Comparing the performances of WPA, 802.11i and the WEP protocols in 
Table 6, we observe that 802.11i is the only protocol that satisfies all the listed 
requirements in the table. 802.11i adopts AES encryption which is approved by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for use in government 
applications. More importantly, AES is approved by the National Security Agency 
for use in protecting classified information up to the SECRET level [CNSS 2003], 
provided that encryption keys of at least 128 bits are used.  Furthermore, the 
CBC-MAC integrity protection is not susceptible to denial-of-service attacks as 
compared to the Michael implementation in WPA.  
There are some issues that need to be considered when deciding to adopt 
the 802.11i standard in the enterprise architecture. 802.11i requires additional 
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hardware co-processors in order to support AES encryption, and these co-
processors are not available in current 802.11 NICs and access points. Hence, 
extensive hardware upgrades/replacement is required to upgrade current 
networks to 802.11i standard.  However, 802.11i-compliant products are only 
expected to emerge in the market in early 2005. In the meantime, it is 
recommended that current 802.11 networks are upgraded to WPA standard  
The recommendations with regards to 802.11i and WPA are as follows: 
1. Evaluate and adopt 802.11i when it becomes available. 802.11i 
currently provides the best security among the 802.11 security 
protocols.  
2. In the mean time, all wireless network equipment should be 
updated to WPA standard. Current 802.11 network equipment can 
be upgraded to WPA standard via a software or firmware upgrade.  
3. When evaluating 802.11i products, verify that these support at least 
128-bit encryption keys, which is the minimum key length required 
for AES to be used in a network with SECRET classification. 
802.11i products that support longer encryption keys (192-bits, 256-
bits etc) can be used in networks with classification of up to TOP 
SECRET.  It is useful also to verify that the different key lengths 
can be selected to match the corresponding security classification 
of the network. 
4. Regardless of WPA or 802.11i, additional layers of defense should 
be built over the link layer defense mechanism to provide enhanced 
security. The next chapter will discuss some these additional 




IV. ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE DESIGN 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the preceding chapter, we studied the WEP, WPA and 802.11i link layer 
protocols provided in the IEEE 802.11 standard. In this chapter, we will look at 
other security mechanisms and implementations that can be built on top of 
802.11 link security to provide a strong, multi-layered defense architecture. The 
objective of a multi-layered defense architecture is to provide defense in depth, 
such that the failure of a particular defense mechanism will not compromise the 
defenses of the entire network. It will also provide flexibility and scalability in the 
design, whereby layers can be added or removed to suit the specific needs of a 
particular network.  
 
B. VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS 
Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are commonly used by enterprises to allow 
users to access enterprise network resources securely over a public network 
infrastructure. In general, VPNs employ encryption and encapsulation techniques 
to create a virtual tunnel that supports secure data communications over a non-
secure network.  However the specific encryption and encapsulation methods 
employed vary from vendor to vendor.  
Most existing VPN implementations are based on the IPSec security 
protocol. IPSec provides data encryption using the 3-DES encryption algorithm. 
There are also VPN implementations that adopt AES and other encryption 
algorithms.  In the context of this thesis, a VPN implementation using AES 
encryption (with at least 128 bit key) is recommended to satisfy the confidentiality 










Figure 7. Integration of VPN with Wireless Network Architecture 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the integration of VPNs for the typical wireless network.  
A VPN gateway is deployed at the edge of the enterprise network, and all 
wireless clients will have to connect via the VPN gateway in order to access the 
enterprise network resources.   A VPN tunnel is created from the VPN gateway, 
through the wireless access point and terminating at the wireless client. Data 
packets transmitted along this path will be protected by the VPN tunnel. 
Implementing 802.11i link security will add additional protection along the tunnel 
between the access point and the wireless device.  Hence any attacker 
attempting to infiltrate via the wireless network will have to break 2 strong layers 
of defenses, the 802.11i link protection and the VPN tunnel. 
 
C. APPLICATION ENCRYPTION 
In applications that require higher levels of protection, the use of 
encryption should be considered to protect the confidentiality and integrity of data 
traveling from sender to receiver. While VPNs and 802.11 link security 
mechanisms also apply encryption to data, they do not provide end-to-end 
protection. As seen from Figure 1, data is encrypted by VPN and 802.11i when it  
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travels between the VPN gateway and the wireless client terminal. However, data 
traveling between the enterprise network and the VPN gateway is transmitted in 
the clear.  
To provide end-to-end protection, applications can encrypt data packets 
before they are sent out into the network. At the receiving end, the encrypted 
data will have to be successfully decrypted before the data can be processed. 
While the encryption and decryption processes are relatively straightforward, the 
complexity of encryption schemes is in the generation, distribution and 
management of keys used in the encryption process. Currently, Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) is commonly used in INTERNET and enterprise applications 
for data encryption and key management. PKI provides strong encryption, as well 
as strong authentication through digital signing. However, the drawback of PKI is 
complexity, and it requires the installation of Certificate Authorities (CAs) and 
other PKI infrastructure in the network.  










Figure 8. PKI-based Infrastructure 
 
Figure 8 shows the integration of a PKI-based encryption scheme into the 
wireless architecture. A PKI Certificate Authority is installed within the enterprise 
network to support the generation of PKI certificates to users in the network. 
Using this infrastructure, the application server and the wireless device can 
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encrypt their data and communicate securely end-to-end. The concept of 
defense in depth is again demonstrated since the encrypted data packets will be 
further protected by the VPN tunnel and 802.11i mechanisms as they travel 
between the VPN gateway and the wireless client. 
 
D. MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION 
To provide strong authentication protection, consider the use of multi-
factor authentication. Multi-factor authentication adds strength to current 
authentication mechanisms by adding the attributes of “something you have” to 
the traditional “something you know” (i.e. passwords) schemes. Examples 




A network monitoring tool should be deployed in the enterprise 
architecture to monitor and analyze traffic that flows through the wireless 
network. Deploying a monitoring system is critical for timely detection of probes 
and attacks, as well as to look out for rogue access points.  
Rogue access points are unauthorized access points that are installed in a 
network. Rogue access points present a risk to the network because they can 
open up back-door channels for attackers to infiltrate and attack the network. 
Attackers can also set up access points to masquerade as a legitimate network. 
When a user attempts to connect to these spoofed networks, the attacker could 
collect valuable information such as passwords and authenticating materials 
which is sent by the unsuspecting client.  
There are a number of companies that provide monitoring and intrusion 




F. DEVICE SECURITY 
As computing devices become smaller and more portable, the probability 
that such devices will be stolen or lost increases substantially. The loss of a 
device can compromise the security of the enterprise network, since encryption 
keys and classified information may have been stored on the device.  
One potential solution is to apply biometric security, such as fingerprint 
scanning and recognition onto the mobile devices. An example of a mobile 
device employing biometric security is the HP IPAQ Pocket PC 5450 shown in 
Figure 9.  
Figure 9. Biometric Protected Device: HP IPAQ Pocket PC 5450 PDA 
(from[PCWorld 2004]) 
 
Biometric protection provides significant improvements to mobile device 
security. When incorporated with security applications, different levels of 
protection can be provided to suit the needs of different operating environments. 
This is an area that should be further investigated.  For example, the PDA can be 
programmed to block access to files stored on the PDA if proper credentials are 
not supplied, and an administrator is then required to unlock those files.  In 
environments where the loss of the PDA could result in severe operational 
consequences (such as in a tactical environment), the PDA could even be 
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programmed to erase all its memory and disks contents via a hard reset in the 
event of multiple unsuccessful logins.  
 
G. MEDIUM-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
In most traditional systems, the decision to grant or deny access to 
classified information is typically based on user access rights. However, user 
access rights do not provide the fine grained controls that may be required by the 
enterprise’s security policy, such as restricting access to classified information 
from the wireless network.  
  This section describes an access control mechanism that controls 
access to information, based on the access medium (i.e. wired or wireless 
network).  This prototype system extends the proof-of concept demonstrator 
developed in [Nandram 2004]. [Nandram 2004] proposes the use of Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) tags to differentiate the contents in a particular 
document based on their security classifications.   Based on the user’s access 
rights and the type of access medium, only the relevant sections within the 
document will be extracted and served to the users.  
The concept demonstrator developed in [Nandram 2004] uses the source 
IP address to determine if the medium of access was a wired or wireless 
network.  However, an IP based scheme requires a segregation of the wireless 
and wired subnets. An alternative method of determining the medium of access 
is to use the Medium Access Control (MAC) address. The MAC address is 
unique to individual networks cards and can be used to identify if it is a wired or 






1. Concept of Operation 
The concept of operation for the prototype access control mechanism is 
shown in Figure 10.  
Security Database











Submit Request + MAC_1
Submit Request + MAC_2
 
Figure 10. Concept of Operations for Medium-Based Access Control 
 
In Figure 10, the security database look-up table contains the MAC 
addresses of all authorized network interface cards, as well as the type of the 
card, i.e. a wired or wireless network card. It also contains the highest security 
classification of information that the different domains are authorized to carry. In 
this example, the wired network can carry information up to “UNCLASSIFIED 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”, and the wireless network can carry up to 
“UNCLASSIFIED” information. 
When a client requests information from the information server, it has to 
provide its MAC address to the information server along with the request. On 
receiving the MAC address, the information server will query the look-up table in 
the security database to derive information on the medium of access and the 
classification of information that can be sent. In this illustration, the wireless client 
will get information content that is rated “UNCLASSIFIED”, and if the same client 
were to request for the same information on the wired network, the client will 
receive information content that is rated “UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE 
ONLY”. In the event that a submitted MAC address is not found in the security 
database, the client will be denied information from the server.  
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2. Implementation and Design 
The classes that were implemented for the demonstrator are shown in 




POST Request “http:… + MAC Address





CLIENT APPLICATION SERVER APPLICATION
 
Figure 11. Design Implementation  
 
The design involved software applications on the client end and at the 
server. For the client application, the key classes are: 
• ContentGUI : Provides the graphical user interface for users to 
invoke requests 
• GetMACAddress: Provides functionality to extract the MAC address 
of the client terminal 
• HTTPFunctions: Provide methods to post and receive HTTP 
requests from the server. A request for a resource is concatenated 
with the client terminal’s MAC address when it is sent to the server. 
The response that is expected from the server is a HTML link to the 
requested resource 
• BrowserStarter: Used to invoke a browser window to display the 




On the server application, the key classes and files are: 
• MACList.dat: This is a simple file that contains a list of registered 
MAC addresses, and the type of card (i.e. wired or wireless) that is 
associated with each MAC address 
• NetServer: This is a servlet application that listens for requests from 
users. NetServer extracts out the MAC address of the requesting 
user and checks it against MACList.dat to determine if the user is 
on the wired or wireless network. The NetServer class accesses a 
pre-stored webpage (page.html), and extracts out the relevant 
contents for the user.   
• XMLParser:  This class was not implemented due to time and 
resource constraints. In the current prototype, the parsing was 
performed by the NetServer servlet.  
The source codes for the various classes are listed in Appendix B. 
 
3. Demonstration Program 
The Graphical User Interface (GUI) implemented in the ContentGUI class 
is shown in Figure 12  . The ContentGUI class provides the interface to allow a 
user to connect to the server and request for pages stored on the server. In this 
case, the program connects to the NetServer servlet using HTTP function calls, 
and appends the user terminal’s MAC address to the HTTP POST request when 




Figure 12, User Graphical Interface 
Upon receiving a request, the server will generate the requested 
information on a web page and return a HTTP link. Invoking the OPEN button will 
open the web page for viewing on the default web browser the link for browsing 
by invoking the OPEN  button. 
Figure 13 shows the view of a web page generated for a user accessing 
the server via the wired network. In this example, he will be able to see 
information that is classified up to “UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY”. 
 
Figure 13. View for User Connected Via the Wired Network 
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Figure 14 shows the view of the web page generated for a user accessing 
via the wireless network. In this case, the user is only able to access information 
up to “UNCLASSIFIED” level. 
 




In the current prototype, the MAC address is sent to the information server 
without encryption. This raises a concern that the MAC address can be spoofed 
and used to gain unauthorized access to the information server. A potential 
attacker could easily capture the data packets traveling between the client and 
the server using a simple packet analyzer. Since the MAC address is not 
encrypted, the attacker could easily extract the MAC address from the captured 
packets, and modify or replace it with another MAC address. Encryption should 
therefore be considered to protect the MAC address and prevent spoofing or 
unauthorized modification.  
 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined a layered-defense strategy that can be adopted to 
secure the enterprise wireless network. This includes adopting the 802.11i link 
security protocol, and building additional layers of defense such as including 
VPNs, encryption and strong authentication. This chapter also recommended the 
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installation of monitoring tools to monitor the wireless network for suspicious 
activities and for rogue access points, as well as physical security for mobile 
devices. Lastly a prototype medium-based access control mechanism was 
implemented to provide fine grained control of the information that can be 




Wireless networks offer the benefits of mobility to the enterprise, but could 
become a security concern if not properly secured. While wireless networks are 
inherently less secure then wired networks, a proper security implementation can 
protect the wireless network sufficiently for it to be used in the enterprise 
environment. 
In this thesis, we studied the problem of implementing a wireless 
enterprise architecture that meets the specific needs of a DoD enterprise 
network. A thorough review of the technologies and security implementations 
pertaining to wireless networks was conducted. The research culminated in the 
proposal of a layered defense architecture that integrates the various technical 
solutions into a cohesive defensive mechanism for the enterprise network. The 
architecture builds on the link layer security mechanisms provided by the IEEE 
802.11 standard, and adds additional layers of protection such as VPN and 
encryption to protect data in transit over the enterprise network.  A policy control 
mechanism was developed that allows a network administrator to control the flow 
of sensitive information to and from the wireless network. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
This thesis provides a basic architecture for implementing a secure WLAN 
network for DoD specified applications. There is significant room for 
improvements and additional research. Future work in the following areas is 
recommended 
1. WLAN Security Test Bed 
With the conceptual design of the wireless architecture in place, the next 
step will be to implement the architecture on a test bed system. This system will 
be useful for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of the various mechanisms 
proposed in the architecture. 
 42
2. Medium-based Access Control Prototype 
There are limitations in the current prototype of the medium-based access 
control system. The current prototype does not provide encryption to protect the 
MAC address information submitted by the client terminals. Furthermore, the 
XML framework proposed in [Nandram 2004] was not implemented due to 
resource and time constraints.  Further work is required to develop this tool into a 
useful access control mechanism. These include 
• Integrate application encryption features described in Chapter 4 
into the prototype system. This will add security to the 
communications between the client terminal and the information 
server. 
• Integrate the XML framework into the current prototype. Instead of 
implementing the file conversion at the servlet application, an XML 
parser can be used to extract the relevant information from a 
document and serve it to the client.   
• Additional decision rules can be included to further improve on the 
usefulness of the current prototype. A possible area is to integrate 
RF-ID tags which track the location of the client terminal in the 
premises of the enterprise. Based on the location of the client 
terminal, information with the appropriate security clearance will be 
sent to that client. This will be useful in enforcing policies which 
restrict the flow of classified information only in certain rooms or 
areas in the enterprise.  
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APPENDIX A. OVERVIEW OF IEEE 802.11 STANDARD 
A. OVERVIEW 
The IEEE 802.11 standard was first introduced in 1997 to provide wireless 
networking over limited ranges. The original 802.11 standard operated in the 900 
MHz range and provided data rates of up to 2 Mbps. IEEE has since introduced a 
number of extensions to the 802.11 standard, notably 802.11a, 802.11b, 
802.11g. A comparison of the different 802.11 protocols is shown below in Table 
7. 
 802.11a 802.11b 802.11g 
Frequency Band 5GHz UNII 2.4GHz ISM 2.4 GHz ISM 
Modulation 
Scheme 
OFDM DSSS DSSS or OFDM 
Number of Data  
Channels 
12 3 3 
Data Rate (Max) 54 Mbps 10 Mbps 54 Mbps 
Range 50 m 100 m 100 m 







Table 7.   Comparison of existing 802.11 Protocols 
802.11b is currently the most widely accepted standard among the three 
standards. The 802.11g was recently ratified in 2003 and is expected to gain a 
foothold in the market when products supporting 802.11g are released on the 
market.   
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B. MODES OF OPERATION 
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines 2 basic modes of operations for 
wireless networking: infrastructure and ad-hoc  mode.  
In the infrastructure mode, wireless computer terminals communicate with 
each other via a wireless access point (AP). The AP coordinates the WLAN and 
controls the data communications between the wireless terminals. It also 
provides a bridge between the wired and the wireless network. A typical WLAN 
system operating in the infrastructure mode is shown in Figure 15 . 











Figure 15. WLAN Operating in Infrastructure Mode 
 
In the ad-hoc mode, the wireless computer terminals communicate directly 
with each other without the use of an access point. This mode is also commonly 
known as peer-to-peer mode. The ad-hoc mode provides a simple and easy way 
for wireless terminals to exchange information without requiring an infrastructure 
network. A typical ad-hoc network setup is shown in Figure 16. 
 45
PDA with Wireless 
Network Card







Figure 16. WLAN Operating in Ad-Hoc Mode 
 
C. COLLISION DETECTION AND AVOIDANCE 
The 802.11 standard uses the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol to resolve collisions during 
transmissions. Collisions occur when 2 or more terminals transmit simultaneously 
while operating in the same channel. 
In the CSMA/CA protocol, any terminal that wishes to transmit information 
is required to sense the medium for any activity. If the medium is busy, the 
terminal will wait for a period of time before attempting to transmit again. If the 
medium is free, the source terminal transmits a Request-to-Send (RTS) packet to 
the destination terminal. On receiving the RTS packet, the receiver terminal will 
sense the medium and respond with a Clear-to-Send (CTS) packet if the medium 
is free. The source terminal will start data transmission only when the CTS is 
received successfully. All other terminals that receive the RTS and CTS 
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APPENDIX B. SOURCE CODES 
A. CLIENT APPLICATION MODULE 
1. ContentGui.java 
//****************************************************** 
// Name: ContentGui.java 
// Purpose: This class implements the GUI portion of the  
//  Client Application Module 
// Arguments: None 
// Output: None 
//****************************************************** 
 
import java.lang.*; // Fundamental class for Java programs 
import java.net.*; // For socket 
import java.io.*; // For IOException and Input/OutputStream 
import java.util.*; 
import java.awt.*; // Containing classes for user interfaces 
import java.awt.event.*; 
import javax.swing.*; // For GUI programming 
 
 
public class ContentGUI extends JFrame implements ActionListener{ 
 
//Text Fields for Server URL, Port Number, Local MAC Address, returned 
URL 
 
static private JTextField jtfServerURL, jtfPortNum, jtfMAC, jtfURL; 
 
// Buttons "Submit" - to submit request to server 
// Buttin "Open" - to open returned URL link in a new web browser 
 
private JButton jbtSubmit, jbtOpen; 
 
static final int LEFT = 0; 
static final int CENTER = 1; 
static final int RIGHT = 2; 
 
// default string values for the test fields 
 
static final String strServerURL = 
"http://131.120.10.153:8080/servlet/NetServer"; 
static final String strPortNum = "8080"; 










public ContentGUI () { 
 
 setTitle("Content Management Panel"); 
  
 //************************************************************** 
 // Create the panels 
 //************************************************************** 
  
 JPanel p1 = new JPanel(); 
 p1.setLayout(new FlowLayout(LEFT));  
 p1.add(new JLabel("Server URL")); 
 p1.add(jtfServerURL = new JTextField(strServerURL)); 
  
  
 JPanel p2 = new JPanel(); 
 p2.setLayout(new FlowLayout(LEFT));  
 p2.add(new JLabel("Server Port")); 
 p2.add(jtfPortNum = new JTextField(strPortNum)); 
 p2.add(new JLabel("MAC Address")); 
 p2.add(jtfMAC = new JTextField(12)); 
 
  
 JPanel p3 = new JPanel(); 
 p3.setLayout(new FlowLayout(LEFT));  
 p3.add(jbtSubmit = new JButton("Submit")); 
  
  
 JPanel p4 = new JPanel(new BorderLayout()); 
 p4.add(p1, BorderLayout.NORTH); 
 p4.add(p2, BorderLayout.CENTER); 
 p4.add(p3, BorderLayout.SOUTH); 
 
 
 JPanel p5 = new JPanel(); 
 p5.setLayout(new FlowLayout(LEFT));  
 p5.add(new JLabel("Status")); 
 p5.add(jtfURL = new JTextField(20)); 
 
 JPanel p6 = new JPanel(); 
 p6.setLayout(new FlowLayout(LEFT));  
 p6.add(jbtOpen = new JButton("Open")); 
 jbtOpen.setEnabled(false); 
 
 //Register listeners 
 
 jbtSubmit.addActionListener(this); 











 // Add panels to the frame 
 //************************************************************** 
 getContentPane().setLayout(new BorderLayout()); 
 getContentPane().add (p4, BorderLayout.NORTH); 
  
 getContentPane().add (p5, BorderLayout.CENTER); 
  




public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { 
  





 String strMAC; 
 GetMacAddress gMac = new GetMacAddress(); 






public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent e){ 
 
String strSubmitURL, strData, strReply; 
 
String actionCommand = e.getActionCommand(); 
HTTPFunctions hConn = new HTTPFunctions(); 
//Handle button events 
 
if(e.getSource() instanceof JButton){ 
 
 if ("Submit".equals(actionCommand)){ 
 strSubmitURL = jtfServerURL.getText(); 
 strData = jtfMAC.getText(); 
 try{ 
 strReply = hConn.PostRequest(strSubmitURL, strData); 
  
 if (strReply.compareToIgnoreCase("Invalid MAC Address")== 0) 
  jtfURL.setText(strReply); 
  else{ 
  jtfURL.setText(strReply); 
  jbtOpen.setEnabled(true); 
  }  





 if ("Open".equals(actionCommand)){ 
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 String str = jtfURL.getText(); 
 try{ 
 BrowserStarter bb = new BrowserStarter(); 
 bb.openURL("http://131.120.10.153/out.html"); 
 jbtOpen.setEnabled(false); 









// Name: GetMacAddress.java 
// Purpose: Class that retrieves the MAC address of the 
//  local host terminal 
// Arguments: None 









public class GetMacAddress { 
 
public GetMacAddress(){}  //constructor 
 
 
public String getMac(){ 
 
String []cmd = {"cmd.exe","/c","ipconfig /all"}; 
String output = ""; 
String MAC_Address = ""; 
try { 
Process ps = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd); 
int ptr = 0; 
InputStream in; 
in = new BufferedInputStream(ps.getInputStream()); 
StringBuffer buffer = new StringBuffer(); 
while( (ptr = in.read()) != -1 ) { 
buffer.append((char)ptr); 
} 




StringTokenizer st = new StringTokenizer(output,"\n"); 
int i=1; 
String line=""; 









line = st.nextToken(); 
System.out.println(line); 
 
line = st.nextToken(); 
  
 if (line.trim().startsWith("Media State")){ 
 line= st.nextToken(); 
 line= st.nextToken(); 





if (line.trim().startsWith("Physical Address")) 
{ 
 
MAC_Address = line.trim(); 
StringTokenizer st1 = new StringTokenizer(MAC_Address,":"); 
st1.nextToken(); 
MAC_Address = st1.nextToken(); 





//System.out.println("Token "+(i++)+":"+ line); 
} 
//System.err.print(loadStream(ps.getErrorStream())); 
























//Purpose:  Provide methods for applications to invoke HTTP Post  








public class HTTPFunctions { 
 
public HTTPFunctions(){}  //constructor 
 
public String PostRequest( String strURL, String data) throws 




// generic function to send a post request to the server. 
String strOut = ""; 
URL url = new URL(strURL); 
HttpURLConnection connection = (HttpURLConnection)url.openConnection(); 
connection.setRequestMethod("POST"); 
connection.setDoOutput(true); 
    




BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new 
InputStreamReader(connection.getInputStream())); 
 
//Read the return text only if the response is OK 
 
if (connection.getResponseCode() == HttpURLConnection.HTTP_OK) 
 { 
  String line; 
  while ((line = in.readLine()) != null) 
  { 
   strOut = line; 
  } 
 } 









B. SERVER SIDE APPLICATIONS 
1. NetServer.java 
// *************************************************************** 
// Name: NetServer.java 
// Purpose: Implements a servlet application that accepts HTTP 
//  Post requests from clients 
//  This servlet extracts out the MAC address that is  
//  appended with the HTTP post request 
//  Based on the MAC address, the servlet extracts out  
//  the relevant information from the template information 
//  file page.html and stores the relevant content in 
//  new HTML file out.html 
//  The client is returned the URL link to out.html 
//**************************************************************** 







public class NetServer extends HttpServlet { 
  
//GetMacType gType = new GetMacType();         
 
private String processData(char[] inData) { 
                String s = new String(inData); 
                StringBuffer sb = (new StringBuffer(s)).reverse(); 
                return  sb.toString(); 
        } 
 
public String Extract(String CLASSIFICATION , String File_Name){ 
 
BufferedReader infile = null; 
FileReader frs = null; 
FileWriter fws = null; 
PrintWriter out = null; 
String strTemp; 
 
try {  
 frs = new FileReader( File.separator + "var" + File.separator +  
     "www" + File.separator + "html" +  
     File.separator +  File_Name); 
 
 infile = new BufferedReader(frs); 
 
 fws = new FileWriter( File.separator + "var" + File.separator +  
     "www" + File.separator+ "html" +  
     File.separator  +  "out.html");  
 
  
 out = new PrintWriter(fws); 
 
 boolean blnWriteCurrentLine = true; 
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 while ((strTemp = infile.readLine()) != null) 
 { 
  // gets rid of the <low> and </low> tags 
  if 
((strTemp.trim().startsWith("<low>"))||(strTemp.trim().startsWith("</lo
w>"))) 
  strTemp = infile.readLine(); 
   
  // Removes high classification content if Access right is 
low 
 
  if (strTemp.trim().startsWith("<high>")){ 
    
   if(CLASSIFICATION.compareToIgnoreCase("low")==0) 
   blnWriteCurrentLine = false; 
 
   if(CLASSIFICATION.compareToIgnoreCase("high")==0) 
   blnWriteCurrentLine = true; 
   String str = ""; 
 
   strTemp = infile.readLine(); 
   do{ 
   
   str = str + strTemp; 
   strTemp = infile.readLine(); 
   
   }while(!(strTemp.trim().startsWith("</high>"))); 
   strTemp = str;    
   //while (!(strTemp.trim().startsWith("</high>"))){ 
   //strTemp = infile.readLine();   
   //} 
    
    
       
    
 
  } 
  
 if (blnWriteCurrentLine) 
 out.println(strTemp); 
 






 try { 
 if (frs !=null) frs.close(); 
 if (fws !=null) fws.close(); 







public String getMACType(String MAC_ADDR , String File_Name){ 
 
BufferedReader infile = null; 
FileReader frs = null; 
StringTokenizer st; 
String strTemp; 
String strType = "UNK"; 
String strMac; 
int intType = 0; 
int IntCount = 0; 
 
try {  
 frs = new FileReader(File.separator + File_Name); 
 infile = new BufferedReader(frs); 
  
 while ((strTemp = infile.readLine()) != null) 
 { 
  
 st = new StringTokenizer(strTemp, "\t"); 
 strMac = st.nextToken(); 
 System.out.println(strMac); 
 if (strMac.compareToIgnoreCase(MAC_ADDR)==0) 
  { 
   strType = st.nextToken(); 
   break; 






 try { 
 if (frs !=null) frs.close(); 







        // used to test this servlet. 
public void doGet(HttpServletRequest request,                                
HttpServletResponse response) throws IOException, ServletException { 
 PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); 
      response.setContentType("text/plain"); 
      out.write("The NetServer Servlet is working"); 
      out.flush(); 







    //** 
    // * Respond to a POST request for the content produced by 
    // * this servlet. 
    // * 
    // * @param request The servlet request we are processing 
    // * @param response The servlet response we are producing 
    // * 
    // * @exception IOException if an input/output error occurs 
    // * @exception ServletException if a servlet error occurs 
    // *// 
 
public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request,HttpServletResponse 
response) throws IOException, ServletException { 
  
 Date date = new Date(); 
      BufferedReader reader = request.getReader(); 
      char inData[] = new char[request.getIntHeader("Content-Length")]; 
      reader.read(inData, 0, inData.length); 
  
      StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer(); 
               
 sb.append("NetServer Servlet\r"); 
      sb.append(date.toString() + "\r"); 
      sb.append(new String(inData) + "\r"); 
  
   
 String strMAC = new String(inData); 
 String strVal = getMACType(strMAC, "MACList.dat"); 
   
 if (strVal.compareToIgnoreCase("WIRELESS")==0) 
 {strVal = Extract("low", "page.html");  
  
 sb.append("http://131.120.10.153/out.html" + "\r"); 
 }else if (strVal.compareToIgnoreCase("WIRED")==0) 
        
  {strVal = Extract("high", "page.html"); 
  sb.append("http://131.120.10.153/out.html" + "\r"); 
   }else 
  sb.append("Invalid MAC Address" + "\r"); 
  
  response.setContentType("text/plain"); 
            response.setContentLength(sb.length()); 
  
            PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); 
            out.write(sb.toString()); 
            out.flush(); 





2. Sample Content Page (Page.html) 
<html> 
<head> 






UnClassified For Official Use Only 
<ol type=A> 
 <li> Section A 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSFIED FOUO Information 







 <li> Section B 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED Information 





UnClassified For Official Use Only 
<ol type=A> 
 <li> Section C 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Information 







 <li> Section D 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED Information 
























 <li> Section B 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED Information 





 <li> Section D 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED Information 
















UnClassified For Official Use Only 
<ol type=A> 
 <li> Section A 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSFIED FOUO Information 





 <li> Section B 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED Information 
 <li> You should be able to access this section from wired and 
WLAN 
</ul> 
UnClassified For Official Use Only 
<ol type=A> 
 <li> Section C 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED FOUO Information 





 <li> Section D 
 <li> This section contains UNCLASSIFIED Information 
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